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Abstract 
Industrial investment in Colonial India was segregated by the export oriented industries, 
such as tea and jute that relied on British firms and the import substituting cotton textile 
industry that was dominated by Indian firms. The literature emphasizes discrimination 
against Indian capital. Instead informational factors played an important role. British 
entrepreneurs  knew the export markets and the Indian entrepreneurs were familiar with the 
local markets. The divergent flows of entrepreneurship can be explained by the 
comparative advantage enjoyed by social groups in information and the role of social 
networks in determining entry and creating separate spheres of industrial investment.  
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Introduction 
Bombay and Calcutta, two metropolitan port cities, experienced very different 
patterns of industrial investment in colonial India. One was the hub of Indian mercantile 
activity and the other the seat of British business. The industries that relied on the export 
market attracted investment from British business groups in the city of Calcutta. Bombay, 
on the other hand, became the centre of the import substituting textile industry. Indian 
cotton traders from different communities moved from trade to production of cotton 
textiles. Few British entrepreneurs were present.  British industrial interests exercised 
monopoly control over various industrial activities in Calcutta and the hinterland. British 
firms were set up in tea, jute and coal and here the presence of Indians was minimal.  
Although geographical factors determined the location of these industries, who 
invested and why remain questions of interest. Cotton was grown in the hinterland was 
Bombay and tea and jute in the hinterland of Calcutta.  History could matter too. Indian 
merchants in Bombay had a more dominant presence in Bombay. These merchants had a 
strong presence in internal as well in the Indian Ocean trade.  In the cotton textiles industry 
around Bombay, most of the investment was by Indians, who had links with the trade in 
raw cotton. The trade in raw jute around Calcutta was also in the hands of Indian traders, 
but they were not involved in the investment in jute manufacturing until the First World 
War. Investment in tea, jute and coal in and around Calcutta came from the British. A 
puzzle is why did British entrepreneurs not take advantage of these profitable opportunities 
open to Indian merchants. Why did British and Indian investment stay separated? Why did 
British capital flow into some sectors and not to others?   
3 
 
The literature on early industrial development in India has emphasized the role 
British investment and entrepreneurship. Some scholars see it as a crucial factor in the 
development of an economy scarce in capital, technology and entrepreneurial skills.
2
 Max 
Weber claimed that the negative effect of Hinduism on entrepreneurial spirit was a reason 
for India’s economic backwardness.3 Morris criticized Weber, arguing that Indians did 
become industrial entrepreneurs when conditions were attractive.
4
 Others have emphasized 
the negative impact British rule in circumscribing the sphere of operation for domestic 
capital.
5
 This literature emphasizes the discrimination faced by Indian business and the 
favor received by British entrepreneurs from the colonial state. These favours included 
subsidized land transfers to tea planters and legislations in support of contracts with 
indentured workers in these plantations. While this may explain the absence of Indian 
business interests in Calcutta, it does not explain their dominant presence in Bombay.  
More importantly in does not explain the small presence of British capital in the cotton 
textile industry.   
This paper offers an explanation for the segmented world of industrial investment 
by British and Indian capital. By matching the volumes of investment to the ethnicity of the 
investors, I argue that informational asymmetry can explain why capital did not necessarily 
flow to activities of high return. The role of social networks in long distance trade in 
history is well researched. Less is known about its role in investment.  This paper explores 
the role of social networks in decisions to invest in industry. Investors faced significant 
risks and problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information. Consequently, investment 
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flows were influenced by the extent of knowledge that investors had of particular markets. 
The information was transmitted through community networks creating separate spheres of 
investment. I argue that access to information about markets differed across social groups 
and gave an advantage to specific groups in specific markets. Conditional on the initial 
advantage, information flows within a network further accentuated the segregation of 
economic activity by social group and showed up in the different investment patterns in the 
cities of Calcutta and Bombay. 
 The paper is organized as follows: I start with a summary of the theoretical 
literature on long distance capital flows and informational constraints and presents a simple 
model to analyze the determinants of industrial investment in colonial India.  This is 
followed by a discussion of the type and magnitude of industrial investment. The empirical 
section tests for discrimination in industrial investment and the role of social networks in 
entry into industrial activity.  The final section concludes. 
 
Informational Constraints and Capital Flows: A Simple Model of Informational 
Advantage 
 The recent literature on international capital flows provides a backdrop to my analysis 
of the Indian economy in colonial times. .
6
 Only a quarter of British capital went to the 
Empire of which only 30 percent went to the colonies under British rule with India receiving 
two thirds.
7
  Lucas, in his well-known paper, argued that British capital flows to India were 
low even during the colonial period when the threat of expropriation was low and returns 
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were high.
 8
  The low volumes of capital flows could be explained if the imperial power had 
exploited its monopoly position and restricted capital flows to keep returns on capital high. 
This does not seem to have been the case in British India. On the contrary, large inflows of 
capital into the railways were encouraged by guaranteeing favorable rates of return.   
 Bovenberg and Gordon set out a model of asymmetric information to explain why 
capital flows do not equalize returns across countries. They consider a situation where 
domestic investors are better informed about the quality of the investment project than 
foreign investors. Foreigners fear being overcharged and hesitate to buy equity. Thus 
asymmetric information between foreign and domestic investors prevents capital from 
flowing to high return economies.
9
 Empirical evidence from recent cross-country equity 
flows support the view that information asymmetries reduce the involvement of foreign 
investors.
10
 Portes et al. estimate a gravity model for capital flows and find the distance 
and speed of information flows, measured by telephone connections, have significant 
effects. The results suggest that local producers have better information about local 
markets and foreign firms are not willing to undertake long distance investment even 
when political risks are minimal. These informational barriers may be reinforced by the 
absence of institutions that are effective in enforcing commercial contracts.
11
   
In my framework, informational asymmetries are defined by social groups. 
Information flows were easier within social groups and restricted across groups. Therefore 
if one member of a social group invested in a particular industry, others could be persuaded 
to invest in it too. Members of a community made similar decisions to diversify from trade 
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to industry in response to changing economic conditions of the 19
th
 century. The shift from 
cotton trade to production of cotton textiles is a case in point. Community members also 
made similar decisions to migrate.  There are many examples of this. Bhatia and Parsi 
merchants moved as groups from Surat to Bombay as the city began to grow in the 18
th
 
century.
12
 Marwari traders moved as a group from North –Western India towards the East 
in search of new business opportunities.
13
  
We can think of two channels of information flow through social networks.  The 
informational constraints faced by investors were different from those faced by 
entrepreneurs. Potential entrepreneurs had information about investment opportunities. 
Potential investors were guided by the risk associated with buying shares in a foreign 
company. Familiarity with products could overcome this type informational constraint. 
Reputational value of the entrepreneur could also be an advantage. Entrepreneurs decided 
which is a profitable enterprise and the investors chose whether to invest in the enterprise. 
Investors’ choice depended on who the entrepreneurs were and the type of industry. 
An example of the first is that British savers invested in companies started by 
British entrepreneurs.  An example for the second type of information is tea, where the 
product was present in the consumption basket of the average British consumer giving 
them an incentive to invest in this industry.  I will return to this point in the next section. 
For now, I focus on the informational constraints facing entrepreneurs. Potential 
entrepreneurs have different quality of information about investment opportunities. This 
information is shared with members of the community so that it influences their decisions 
to enter a particular industry.  I put forward a simple model to illustrate the way in which 
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informational flows within a community give rise to a herding effect so that different 
communities specialize in different industries.  
Consider two sectors and two communities. First, any initial entrant is a pioneer, 
who observes only imperfectly which niche is profitable. The pioneer has the option to 
enter either industry and select a niche. However, in compensation, such an entrant earns 
monopoly profits initially. Second, entrants from the same community become informed 
about the profitability of a niche once successful entry takes place. By entering the same 
industry, they face reduced risk, and this offsets the congestion arising from additional 
entry. On the other hand, entrants from a different community suffer from competition and 
the congestion and have no informational benefits. This produces a tendency towards 
segregation, with different communities specializing in distinct industries.  
Assume for simplicity that there are two industries, A and B 
 In each industry, there are several niches , indexed by  i ∈ 1,2,..,n} 
 Only one of these niches is profitable, and each of them has equal prior probability. 
 Let L be the loss suffered by entering an unprofitable niche. Let Gi  be the gain from 
entering a profitable niche in industry i, i∈{A,B}.  
We assume that Gi  is a random variable that is independently and identically distributed 
according to density f on [G ,Ĝ]. 
 At each date t, individual  has an investment opportunity, and can invest either in industry 
A or B, and must also choose a niche to enter in either industry.  
He observes GA and GB, and also observes signals SA and SB, where Si ∈{1,2,...,n} is a 
signal of which niche is profitable.  Si equals the profitable niche with probability p>(1/n), 
and with probability ((1-p)/(n-1) i t equals one of the other niches.  
Thus the posterior probability of success of a niche for which a favorable signal is obtained 
is p, and the expected profit from entry (without any additional information), is 
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pGi+(1-p)L-c,  where c is the cost of capital. 
14
  
Let  Ĝ denote the break -even level of profit where the above expression equals zero. 
Assume that there are no sunk costs. Thus an individual without any additional information 
will enter if and only if Gi≥ Ĝ  
Once he enters, he finds out whether the niche is actually profitable or not. If it is 
profitable, he continues in the industry, and if it is unprofitable, he exits at the end of the 
period. 
 Now consider any individual who follows the first entry. We assume that such an 
individual either belongs to the same community, C, as the first entrant, or to a different 
community, Ĉ.  If he belongs to the same community, he  observes the niche that the first 
entrant chose. He also observes an exit decision  and learns if the first entrant’s choice was 
the right one.  Thus, he now believes that the probability that this niche is profitable is 1 
rather than p.  As in the models of herd behavior,
15
 the follower will ignore his own 
information and the signal he observes and follow the first entrant. However, he has to 
share profits with the current incumbent , and his payoff is Gi(2)<Gi.  
More generally, let Gi(m) denote the profits when m firms are already in the market, which 
is assumed to be decreasing in m. Thus for any value of t Gi, here exists m∗ Gi such that at 
most m∗ firms can profitably enter. Note that this value of m∗ assumes that firms perfectly 
know which niche is profitable. 
Notice that a following entrant of the same community also learns that the niche is not 
profitable if the first entrant exits after one period. If the follower observes a positive signal 
for a different niche, he assigns a higher probability p1 > p .
16
 
Consider now an individual who is from, Ĉ, a different community from that of the first 
entrant into industry i, and all previous entrants into the industry i. 
Suppose that there are m entrants into this industry. Since he cannot observe the niche, his 
expected profit is 
 p Gi (m)+(1-p)L-c,  
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which is strictly less than the payoff of the first entrant. On the other hand, if no firm has 
entered industry  j, his payoff from entering industry j is given by 
 pGj+(1-p)L-c.  
 Thus if Gj>Gi(m) and Gj≥Ĝ, he will prefer to enter industry j rather than i. In other words, 
an entrant from a different community Ĉ will prefer to enter a new industry as there is less 
competition from the existing firms and he does not have the same informational advantage 
as the members of the community C. 
 Let us consider industry dynamics under the assumption that GA≃GB,  that is profitability 
levels are close to each other in the two industries.  
Let us assume that at each date, there are two possible entrants, one from each community. 
Thus at date 1, in a pure strategy equilibrium, the two entrants will choose different 
industries. If one chooses industry A, the other will prefer industry B since monopoly 
profits in B will be greater than duopoly profits in A.  
Now suppose that both entrants are successful. Then at date 2, each entrant has a choice 
between Gi(2) with probability p (if he chooses the industry of a different community) or 
Gj(2) with probability 1  
Thus if he enters, he will choose the industry chosen by his community predecessor. This 
argument iterates -- at any date that an entrant enters, he will choose the industry chosen by 
the predecessors in his community. 
 Of course, it is possible that one of the initial entrants, say from community Ĉ in industry 
B, chooses a wrong niche as he gets the wrong signal while the entrant from community C 
chooses the right niche.  In this case, he will choose to exit, and the succeeding entrants 
from community  Ĉ  will not have full information on the profitability of the niche, whereas  
following entrants from community C will be fully informed about  the profitable niche in 
industry A.  
It is an equilibrium for  the informed individual to choose industry A, earning GA(2)-c, 
while the uninformed individual chooses a niche in industry B, earning 
pG
B
+(1-p)L-c.   
Thus, even in this case, the pattern of industry specialization by different communities is 
sustained. 
10 
 
To summarize, the model incorporates the advantage of  information flow through the 
community network in reducing risk for a member of the same  social group and offsetting 
the congestion arising from additional entry. A member of the other social group face 
adverse effects competition and congestion without the benefit of better information. This 
produces a tendency towards segregation with different social groups specializing in 
different industries. Even unsuccessful entry by a member of the same community is 
informative as it narrows down the set of profitable niches and the entrants face reduced 
risk. 
This model is ex ante symmetric so that each social group is equally likely to enter 
either industry. In reality, the British had better information about the export markets in tea 
and jute, while the Indians had better knowledge of the domestic market in cotton textiles. 
This implies that the quality of signal, that is the value of  p in the model would depend on 
the identity of the entrant.  It is larger for the British in the export industries and larger for 
the Indian in the import substituting industries. Therefore ex ante the British were more 
likely to be the pioneer in the  export industry and Indians in cotton textiles.  The model 
implies that the herding effect would lead to persistence even if profitability was different 
in the two industries.  To the extent the quality of the signal depended on prior knowledge 
of markets, there may be examples which run contrary to the simple model outlined, such 
as the presence of a few British firms in cotton textiles. Note that these entrepreneurs were 
also involved in the domestic cotton trade and therefore would have a higher p than a 
British firm not involved in cotton trade. 
The model also assumes that the profitability of the industries is stationary over 
time and varies only with the number of entrants. This is a simplification and the model can 
11 
 
be extended to allow for the profit opportunities to change over time across industries. It 
can be modeled by assuming that Gi (m) is determined by a Markov process, where at any 
date, profits could increase or decrease stochastically so that it may become unprofitable 
for a new follower to invest in the industry chosen by a member of his social group even if 
perfectly informed. He may prefer to invest in the other industry even if he is less 
informed. Similarly rising profitability of an industry may induce members of the other 
community to enter even in the absence of full information.  High dividends could  
encourage “outsiders” to buy shares even if they were not socially connected to the 
entrepreneur.  The size of the group of “outsiders” can increase though information flow 
within the social network,  Once the share ownership reaches a critical minimum,  it can 
encourage entry into the industry. The jute industry is a case in point.  Jute traders 
belonging to the Marwari community began to acquire shares in the British firms during 
the First World War and  entered as entrepreneurs in the 1920s. The Marwaris did not take 
over British firms, but set up new firms. With this framework in mind, I turn to the 
dynamics of industrial investment in colonial India, 
 
Capital and Entrepreneurship: The Industrial Divide 
The port cities of Bombay and Calcutta also became the railway hub in the course 
of the 19
th
 century, when  not only raw materials, but industrial goods began to be exported 
out of these cities.  However, there had been a difference in the  interaction between British  
business and Indian commercial interests in the two cities. Both had seen the rise of British 
agency houses  as the trading monopoly of the East India Company ended. While some of 
them ventured into new activities such as coal mining or shipping, their primary 
12 
 
involvement was in trade  and the China trade in cotton and opium was an important 
component.
17
  The presence of Indian merchants in the East was small. Indian partnerships 
with British business in joint stock companies such as Carr, Tagore and Company were 
short lived.
18
  In contrast  in Western India, the Indian merchants had a long history in the 
trading world, including overseas trade based on social networks. Their role in the illicit 
opium trade to China out of the ports in the West shaped their economic importance in the 
region.
19
  With the decline of the opium trade and shipbuilding in the middle of the 19
th
 
century, the communities involved in these activities, such as the Parsis, began to look for 
alternative profitable opportunities.
20
The Indian traders in the West were guaranteed 
brokers for the importers of cotton goods and distributed them in the local markets. But in 
the internal trade in jute cloth, Indian traders were not the principal brokers  and had a 
relatively small presence until the First World War.
21
 It could well be the case that Indian 
merchants had a special position in Bombay and were able to exploit opportunities of 
industrial investment, which they could not in Calcutta. However, it is the case that the 
industries that developed in the two regions targeted separate markets. In the East, tea and 
jute were export commodities mainly and the British had an informational advantage in 
these markets mattered,  In the West , cotton textiles, was an import substituting activity 
and the knowledge of the local markets was important. Traders involved in the cotton trade 
and distribution of British imports of cotton textiles had an advantage here. The long 
standing economic role of Indian merchants in the West gave them this advantage. 
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 From the mid-19
th
 century, changes in company law led to the formation of limited 
liability joint stock companies.
22
 Companies were set up by British entrepreneurs who 
could raise capital from markets in Britain as well in India. Firms were floated on the 
London Stock Exchange as sterling companies or in India as rupee companies. The sterling 
companies raised capital in Britain and traded shares in the London stock market. Some 
sold block shares to British expatriates in India. The rupee companies raised capital from 
Indians as well as British expatriates, for whom this was ideal investment opportunity. The 
capital for the rupee companies came from British civil servants, army personnel and 
traders.
23
 These firms were run by managing agents or specialist management firms that 
owned shares, but were not required to have a majority shareholding. The managing agents 
managed companies across industries through long term agency contracts. They could be 
either British or Indian firms, the latter typically the Indian counterpart of the British agent.  
In the context of India’s industrial sector, firms are classified as British or India in 
relation to the managing agent. We can adopt a simple criterion to classify all sterling 
companies as British owned and managed. The picture is less clear for rupee companies. 
Capital was raised in India and did not show up as direct inflow of foreign capital. 
However, the managing agents were the Indian counterpart of the British agency firms and 
acted as an indicator of ownership. This is a reasonable assumption as all decisions were 
undertaken by these agents and the new issue of shares also relied on their reputation and 
social connections. The reputational value of the managing agency houses in raising capital 
in the British and Indian markets was important. If a new firm was unknown to the British 
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investor, the managing agent associated with it had a reputation.
 24
 The managing agency 
system may be seen as an institutional innovation, which addressed the problem of 
informational constraints in long distance investment by providing a trustworthy name to 
the British investor. This system was universally adopted by British business in Asia. 
Table1 shows the involvement of several leading managing agents in different industries.  
British investors could invest in sterling or rupee companies. They could choose to 
invest in tea, cotton or jute or utilities such as railways. There were two types of British 
investors: those resident in Britain and those resident in India. The first group invested 
mainly in sterling companies in railways and public utilities and in tea, while the second 
invested in rupee companies in tea, jute and coal. Britain was the main market for tea, and 
consumers were familiar with the product. In India, it was still a consumption good largely 
unknown. Tea attracted large volumes of sterling investment in London. When the tea 
companies were floated in the 1860s and 1870s, it turned into a mania. On the other hand, 
jute was relatively unknown to the average British consumer and jute companies in 
Scotland might have might have been less risky. Only a handful of jute companies were 
registered in London.  It was a product widely used in India for centuries and most of the 
capital was raised locally from British residents in India looking for profitable investment.  
These Rupee companies in Calcutta were the ideal investment opportunity for the british 
residents in India.
25
 
In the tea industry, which was the largest sector, most companies were sterling 
companies, while in jute and coal, the typical firm was a rupee company managed by the 
Indian counterpart of the British agent. Indian investors could also buy shares in the Rupee 
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companies. While systematic quantitative evidence is difficult to come by, case study based 
evidence from individual managing agency houses indicate that British investors accounted 
for bulk of the investment. For the agency house Bird and Company, nearly 90% of the 
investment in rupee companies in tea and jute came from British investors.
26
 The Indian 
Industrial Commission of 1918 reported by Indian shareholders held just over 15 per cent 
of the shares of jute companies 
27
 
The second largest industrial sector was cotton textiles. Here the Indian firms were 
dominant. Investors in this sector were their friend and family. The Parsis in Bombay had 
the financial resources to subscribe as paid up capital a large part of the authorized capital 
of a new company and well as the reputation to attract interest from the public. 
28
When 
Davar, a Parsi, floated the first cotton mill in 1854, fifty leading traders of Bombay paid up 
the initial capital of Rupees 500,000. Majority of the shareholders, were Parsis, the same 
community as the entrepreneur, but there were others from other Indian caste groups as 
well as two Englishmen.
29
 Davar retained a large chunk of the shares, Parsis and Gujaratis 
subscribed one-third.
30
 In other towns raising capital by Indians proved difficult except 
when backed by community support. When Ranchhodlal set up the first cotton mill in 
Ahmedabad in 1858, most of the shares were bought by his friends and family after he 
failed to raise capital from the local traders.
31
 Examples of raising capital through the 
network of friends and family can be found in the case of other textile entrepreneurs in 
Bombay, such as Tatas and the Bhatia merchants When Tata offered shares to a member of 
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another trading community, a Marwari trader, it was met with skepticism.
32
 Members of 
the Bhatia community were the main shareholders in companies floated by Thackersey, 
Morarjee and Khatau, all Bhatia merchant. 
33
 In Buckingham Mill, one of the few British 
cotton textile firms, Indian shareholders held only one-tenth of the shares.
34
 
The demand for coal came from the British owned railway companies and this 
sector was dominated by British firms. The majority of coal firms were set up and managed 
by British managing agents in India and the investors were British expatriates living in 
India. Jardine Matheson, the managing agent, argued that it was better to issue shares in 
India where there was local knowledge.
35
  
The export trade in jute and tea was in the hands of British companies and this gave 
British entrepreneurs an informational advantage. Jute was sold both in local and foreign 
markets.  About 25% of jute output was sold in the domestic market. This market was well 
known to the Indian traders buying and selling raw jute and jute products
36
, but the local 
traders were reluctant to become entrepreneurs. Demand for coal came from sectors that 
were dominated by British capital. Railways accounted for over 30% of total demand for 
coal.
37
 The cost of transporting coal from Bengal to other region remained high in 
comparison to the price of imports and Indian industry used substantial amounts of 
imported coal. After 1900, the price of imported coal increased making Bengal coal 
competitive in the home market as well as in the nearby export markets.
38
  Indian owned 
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firms that were in the industry were small and produced poorer quality coal that was sold in 
the local market.  
It was the market for cotton textiles was relatively unknown to the average British 
investor. Cotton textile firms in Lancashire exported to the Indian market, where the 
distribution was in the hands of Indian traders. These traders had knowledge of local 
market in cotton textiles and became entrepreneurs when the opportunity arose. The trade 
in raw cotton had been in the hands of these local merchants in Western India. They made 
large profits in the cotton famine, ready to be invested. The cotton traders came from 
specific communities, such as the Parsis and Bhatias, who had a long history in intra-
regional as well as Indian Ocean trade.  One of main British firms that entered this industry 
had also been involved in the cotton trade and the other was set up by a British technician 
working in the industry.
39
 
Table 2 presents a summary of investment in industries in colonial India. Table 3, 
shows the community divide across the two cities Calcutta and Bombay in the first quarter 
of the 20
th
 century in commercial activity including its industrial sub-sector. The racial and 
regional divide is striking suggesting a chasm between the commercial worlds of the two 
cities.   
 Estimates of Investment 
Chapman’s estimates show that total British investment in Sterling and Rupee 
companies increased from £349 million in 1905-06 to £528 million in 1914-15.
40
 Railways 
accounted for nearly half the capital and tea plantations one-fifth. The value of paid up 
capital of 373 sterling companies operating in India was £78 million in 1911, with 
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debentures issued for £45 million. In comparison, the paid up capital of the 2463 
companies registered in India was only £46 million with £6 million debentures.
41
 Table 4 
shows the breakdown of investment in sterling and rupee companies. Tea accounted for the 
largest of sterling investment in 1915.  In jute and coal, investment was primarily in rupees 
and the magnitudes of investment were much smaller, not only in relation to sterling 
investment in tea, but also in comparison with rupee investment in cotton textiles. The two 
largest sectors of investment in 1915 were tea in Eastern India dominated by British 
companies and cotton textiles in Western India dominated by Indian companies. 
Data on paid up capital allows us to track the changes in investment in rupee 
companies from 1880. Paid-up capital is likely to underestimate the total volume of 
investment as enterprises raised loans from banks, particularly British owned firms. Loans 
were obtained from machinery producers as well.
42
 The British agents found it relatively 
easy to borrow from the banks in India. 
43
This creates a distortion if some sectors have 
better access to loans. A more serious problem is that paid up capital in older firms will 
have a lower nominal value. Information is not detailed enough to correct for this. 
Therefore investment in sectors with older firms will be underestimated further.   
Figure 1 presents the relative position of different sectors in rupee investment. In 
1880 tea had the largest share. However, by 1900 investment in cotton textiles was higher 
than that in tea and banking and by 1914 cotton textiles was by far the largest sector of 
Rupee investment. In this paper, the focus will be on cotton vs. jute as examples of 
manufacturing investment. Figure 2 shows Bagchi’s estimates of industrial investment after 
1900. Bagchi uses import of machinery as an indicator of investment. This gets rid of the 
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biases introduced in the use of paid up capital. Industrial investment increased up to the 
First World War, particularly in jute. The period also saw reinvestment of profits by British 
firms in India and investment in industrial firms by British residents encouraged by the 
stable Rupee- Sterling exchange rate.
44
 After the war investment in cotton textiles 
measured by the import of industrial machinery grew relatively faster than investment in 
jute and reflected the change in the balance of investment between Calcutta and Bombay.
45
 
labor 
The return on investment in the Empire has been estimated to be higher than 
investment in domestic securities.
46
 While the average British investor in England would 
have been happy with a rate of return that compared well with the return on investment in 
Britain, Indians sought higher rates of return that was comparable to those obtained in 
alternative activities in India.
47
 Efforts to raise capital for the railways in India had not 
succeeded. But the guaranteed return of 5 per cent was attractive for British middle class 
investors.
48
 Morris suggests that there were differential rates of profit in different activities 
and Indians were drawn to those sectors that yielded a higher rate of return. Traditional 
activities in trade and commerce had high returns. The average rate of return in money 
lending, internal trade and real estate transactions was 9-10%.
49
  Indian entry into the 
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jute industry began only after the jute cartel pushed up profits and suggests that the 
required rate of profit was higher for the Indian entrepreneurs.
50
   
 Morris’s argument, if correct might explain why Indians did not invest in the 
industries dominated by the British. They had no incentive to do so, given the higher 
returns to be obtained in cotton textiles.   However, this view still does explain why the 
British failed to be attracted to cotton textiles.  For an explanation based on social 
discrimination to hold there should have been barriers to entry for Indian entrepreneurs in 
the high echelons of British business in Calcutta. There is support for this. Less than 4 
percent of company directors in tea were Indians and there were none in jute in 1911.
51
 
The race bar disallowed entry of Indians into the London Jute Association and therefore 
acted as a barrier to entry in the export market.
52
 Such barriers operated in one direction 
against Indian capital and do not explain why British capital stayed out of a major 
industry, despite all the advantages it enjoyed under the colonial state. 
53
  
 However informational disadvantage could discourage entry despite other 
advantages enjoyed by British business groups. Informational asymmetries could also 
explain differences in rates of return.  Social groups facing capital shortage would have 
higher rates of return. Morris was the first to recognize that familiarity with markets can 
explain why the spheres of investment were different for British and Indian capital.
54
 
Informational differences gave each social group a different assessment of profitability of 
a sector. Morris argued that Europeans tended to get involved in markets which were 
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export oriented or closely supported by the state.
55
 Most of state support was directed 
towards the tea industry and the jute industry did not enjoy similar political clout. 
Therefore it is difficult to argue that government support played an important role in the 
choice of investment. 
A different view of discrimination is that British capital entered those sectors which 
were complementary to their domestic industrial interests.
56
 Jute was an aberration as this 
industry did not rely on the Indian market as cotton textiles did and Dundee did not have 
the same political clout as Lancashire.  This argument is flawed. Indian jute products 
competed in the world market with the industry in Dundee and gained market share. British 
industrial interests were not a homogeneous group. The interest of Lancashire textile 
producers differed from those of the textile machinery producers. In 1843 the British 
Parliament repealed the act prohibiting the sale of machinery abroad. This opened new 
possibilities for exporters of textile producing equipment in Britain, which they did not 
hesitate to seize. There is much evidence to suggest a close cooperation between Indian 
textile entrepreneurs and the British textile machinery manufacturers. Davar who set up the 
first textile firm in Bombay was advised by Platt Bros from Oldham on the type of 
machinery needed.
57
 In general machinery makers had close contact with the textile 
entrepreneurs. They offered large commissions to promoters of the order of 5% and 
accepted deferred payment.  
The discrimination view is important in the literature, but has not been tested 
empirically.  In the next section, I put forward simple statistical tests to see if there were 
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systematic differences in availability of capital and returns of return, which can explain the 
segregation of British and Indian business. 
   
Measuring constraints  
 The empirical strategy adopted in this paper is to rule out explanations that suggest 
barriers to entry. If discrimination against Indian capital or the privileges enjoyed by British 
capital explain the different spheres investment, then we should be able to measure economic 
attributes that differ across industries 
 Did the minimum efficient scale differ across sectors?  If the Indian entrepreneurs had 
a disadvantage in raising capital through the stock market or had limited access to credit from 
the formal British owned banking sector, they would be more likely to enter industries where 
the initial capital outlay was lower. If scale economies did not matter then, in any given 
industry, firms started by Indians would tend to be smaller.  I can test both propositions using 
firm- level data. 
Table 5 presents comparative start-up capital outlays required in different industries 
using both aggregate data from Rungta and firm–level information from various sources.58 
It shows that the average paid up capital  in cotton mills was lower compared to the paid up 
capital of an average jute mill  right from the 1880s to 1910. However, this is not the case 
for the average coal or tea firm. The absence of Indians in these sectors indicates a 
relatively minor role of a capital constraint. Table 6 focuses on the two comparable 
industries cotton and jute and provides measures of machinery used and employment. 
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Although the machinery employed is not directly comparable across the two sectors, the 
loom is the main equipment for weaving. Many cotton firms produced a large quantity of 
yarn as the finished product. Therefore cotton firms list the number of spindles and looms. I 
construct a measure of loom equivalent by aggregating spindles and looms in the cotton 
industry. (See table 6 for the details) Although the loom equivalent is higher for cotton 
mills, jute firms employed significantly more labor.   This seeming anomaly is due to the 
aggregation problem. About two hundred spindles could be operated by one worker 
whereas one worker attended to one loom. Both capital outlay and number of workers were 
higher in the jute firm. The firm size and the minimum efficient scale could have given 
Indian entrants a disadvantage if they were capital constrained.  However, it has already 
been noted that such an argument cannot be used to explain the absence of Indian 
entrepreneurs in tea and coal. 
The second test for the presence of a capital constraint is to see if there is difference 
in size between British and Indian firms, in industries where they co-exist. If capital 
constraint was systematically greater for the Indians, we might expect Indian firms to be 
smaller than British firms. I compare firms within the industries: cotton and jute. Note that 
Indians were the majority group in cotton, but a minority in jute the opposite holds for the 
jute industry. This procedure has the advantage that we can use a physical measure of 
capital, the loom equivalent, rather than a value measure, since we only make intra industry 
comparisons.
 
On the basis of the measure of loom equivalent and looms, we can make 
comparisons across firms according to ownership for the year 1924.
59
  Table 7 shows that 
in each industry, the majority group has the larger firm, although this difference is not 
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statistically significant. In the cotton textile industry in Bombay, the Indian firms on 
average were larger than British firms, while in the jute industry, British firms were larger. 
Thus the initial hypothesis, that Indians were uniformly more capital constrained, is not 
borne out. Instead it appears that the minority group may face more difficulty in raising 
capital.  If capital had been a constraint for Indian firms, then British firms would tend to 
be larger in all sectors.  
I compute the capital- labor ratio intensities in mills run by different communities in 
the cotton textiles in Bombay to test for systematic differences. The only group which had 
a higher capital- labor ratio is the Sassoon group, reputed to be most efficient in the 
industry. The ratio was similar across all other groups and the British firms were not more 
capital intensive. (See table 8)  
Although Indian entrepreneurs might have been rationed out of the formal banking 
sector, they could raise capital through the indigenous networks. The initial start- up capital 
came from profits made in trade. Entrepreneurs in cotton textiles typically had made money in 
trade as did Indian entrepreneurs in jute. The rupee companies formed by the Indians raised 
finance through local networks. The profits made by the cotton traders during the cotton 
famine of the 1860s created an advantage. The capital to set up the first cotton mills was raised 
by the Parsi entrepreneurs from their own resources and contribution from family and friends. 
The Bhatia merchants, who were the first Hindu entrepreneurs, also raised their own finances
60
  
70-80% of the authorized capital was paid up soon after the firm was set up. Small firms 
tended to sell a small number of high value shares and large firms tended to float shares of low 
face- value that could be taken up by a larger number of investors.
61
 Although Davar had failed 
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to find the financial support in three years earlier, by 1854 raising capital for a cotton mill in 
Bombay did not prove difficult. Oriental mills sold 500 high value shares of Rupees 2500 each, 
but had to limit subscription to four share per person due to the high demand.
62
 On the other 
hand British firms found it more difficult to raise capital in the Bombay region. Greaves, 
Cotton & Company, the largest European managing agent controlling seven spinning mills was 
unable to raise capital to diversify into weaving.
63
 European capital was no more than 10-20% 
of total capital invested in cotton. In Calcutta, the average jute or tea firm did not have 
problems in mobilizing capital.  
 Another constraint that could have deterred entry of Indian entrepreneurs is the rate of 
profit.  Did profit rate differ across industries?  If the Indians were guided by higher returns 
and were capital constrained, then the profit rates should have been higher in cotton textiles 
although there are no obvious reasons why British firms were not attracted by higher profits. 
Existing estimates suggest an average rate of profit of 9 percent in jute and 10 percent in 
cotton. 
64
Table 9 shows the profit rates and dividend rate across sectors using firm level data.  
There were no systematic differences in profits across export and import substituting sectors. 
Cotton and jute showed comparable mean profit rates, while tea had a higher return. Coal 
shows a much lower profit rate with the median firm making no profit. Higher dividends were 
paid in tea, but comparable rates were paid in jute and cotton. If lower median profit rate 
discouraged British business in cotton, this was clearly not the case in coal. Lastly, I test if 
profit rate and dividend rate differed across British and Indian firms in the cotton textiles 
industry. Indian firms show a lower profit rate compared to British firms, but paid out higher 
dividends. A T test shows that these differences are not statistically significant. The empirical 
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exercise shows  no evidence that Indian entrepreneurs were drawn to industries with 
particularly high rates of return or that capital constraint alone determined the industrial divide 
between British and Indian capital   
 
 Social Network Effect 
The role of social networks in economic activity in Sub- Saharan Africa has been 
highlighted by Fafchamps when information about the market is limited and involves 
search costs.
65
 Evidence from traders in Madagascar finds that family ties were important 
in starting businesses, but less important in the long run.
66
  In contemporary India, the 
effect of social network in entry has been explored in the context of the diamond industry. 
The study finds that the entry of a few members of a community in the diamond trade led 
to further entry from the same community which had few outside options.
67
 In 19
th
 century 
India too community ties were important in decisions to enter into industrial activity. These 
caste boundaries were clearly defined. Caste and community networks had been important 
in Indian Ocean trade in the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries.
68
 These same ties formed the basis of 
industrial investment.  Given the non- formal structure of dissemination of information 
about markets, the community was a relatively costless way to acquire information about 
new markets and opportunities. The cotton textile and jute industries provide suitable 
context to study the role of social networks in the early stages if India’s industrialization. In 
cotton textiles, there were broadly five social networks i:  Parsis, Hindus, Muslims, Jews 
and Europeans. The Hindu community was represented by specific trading castes, such as 
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the Bhatias. The jute industry was initially dominated by British firms, but Marwari traders 
became entrepreneurs in the 1920s. 
What was common between the firms that entered the two industries and what was 
the pattern of entry? Was the common factor greater contact with western society and 
higher level of human capital? Tripathi argues that the exposure to new ideas and values 
and a desire to learn western industrial practices was common to the pioneers from 
different communities.
69
 Parsis were the first social group to become industrial 
entrepreneurs. They were also one of the first groups to embrace western education. As a 
community, the Parsis had fewer barriers to interacting with other groups and on foreign 
travel, which gave them greater contact with western society. They were among the most 
educated in Indian society.
70
  Hindus had religious restrictions on foreign travel. The first 
Hindu textile entrepreneur in Bombay, Khatau Makanji belonged to the Bhatia community. 
They had links with the Parsis. The community played an important role in the religious 
reform movement of the 1870s. Mulji Thackersey, one of the leaders visited England and 
admired Western industrial values.
 71
  Ranchhodlal, who set up the first cotton mill in 
Ahmedabad was educated in English and became a civil servant.
72
 
 If education and western contact were the driving factors, then we should observe a 
high level of human capital to be the common factor among the pioneers rather than the 
social network. The first entrants belonged to the Parsi community and as a community 
they enjoyed high level of human capital making it difficult to distinguish between the 
effects of human capital and social network.  The success of the Parsi firms had little 
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impact on the traditional Hindu business groups until 1875.
73
  What is significant is that 
once Khatau Makanji set up a cotton mill, other Bhatia merchants followed.
74
 The majority 
of the Hindu mills in Bombay belonged to the Bhatia merchants. This was the second 
community to dominate the industry. 
What was common between the Parsis and the Bhatias was the history of 
involvement in cotton trade. The Parsis had made their wealth in opium and cotton trade. 
The Bhatias came from Gujarat and traded in raw cotton, textiles and grain. In the case of 
another pioneer Ranchhodlal, who belonged to a community with little involvement in 
trade, entry into the cotton textile industry had a different outcome.  Other social groups in 
his city with links to cotton trade did not follow. The Jains, who were cotton traders, 
refused to get involved when Ranchhodlal approached them for funds. It took them and 
their traditional rivals, the Vaishnava Banias another couple of decades to move into this 
industry.
75
  
Cotton and opium trade was also common history among the pioneers from other 
social groups. David Sassoon, a Jewish entrepreneur, had migrated to Bombay from 
Baghdad and established himself in the opium trade.
 76
  He was a pioneer in his community. 
One of the main British companies was Greaves & Cotton. The company was set up in 
1863 by James Greaves who had been involved in the cotton trade in Gujarat and had 
extensive knowledge of the local markets. George Cotton was an agent of the East India 
Company and was involved in the cotton trade as well. Five spinning mills were set up in 
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the next 20 years.
77
 The managing agent Greaves & Cotton and Bradbury & Brady were 
two British managing agents who controlled twelve out of fifteen British enterprises.
78
 
With the development of the railway lines, the internal trade in cotton, which had been 
dominated by Indian merchants, had become more accessible to the British companies.
79
 
Currimbhoys were Muslim merchants in the Indian Ocean trade although they did not act 
as agents of the English merchants.
80
 Guha sees the success of the Parsis and Gujarati 
communities in Bombay as a consequence of the less imposing presence of the British in 
the commercial sector rather than religion and Western education.
81
 This view does not 
contradict the idea of informational advantage arising from participation in economic 
activity. 
The presence of Indian interests in Calcutta was less significant. The Indian 
merchants in eastern India traded in jute, rice and other agricultural commodities. The 
Marwaris as a group worked closely with British industrial and exporting firms, but did not 
enter industrial activity right up to the First World War. The Bengalis with western 
education entered into partnerships with the British in banking, insurance and shipping in 
the early decades of the 19
th
 century, but disappeared  after the middle of the 19
th
 century 
and the Marwaris emerged as the main brokers to the British companies. Timberg 
documents the rise of the Marwaris as industrial entrepreneurs from the futures market in 
opium, and specie to trade in raw jute and jute products in Calcutta.
 82
  By 1900 Marwari 
traders began to get more prominence in the trade in raw jute and large trading firms 
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emerged. These traders became entrepreneurs two decades later.
83
 The Marwaris started to 
o buy shares in British owned jute firms registered in Calcutta in Calcutta that paid high 
dividends. They also gave loans to cash strapped British firms in return for block shares. 
The entry of the Marwaris into the British boardrooms changed the British dominance of 
the industry.
84
 Birla and Hukumchand invested their wartime profits in the jute trade in the 
first two Indian- owned jute mills in Calcutta after and this encouraged entry by several 
others from the community in the 1920s. Indian entry followed a pattern of social groups 
moving from trade to industry within a sector suggesting the importance of knowledge of 
markets in entrepreneurship and the role of social connection in information sharing.  
The cotton textile industry provides the context to test the role of the social network 
as a determinant of entry. Five different communities, including the British were involved 
in this sector. The largest investment was shared by the Parsis and the Hindus. . The entry 
of different groups happened in clusters and is shown in figure 3. We use entry dates of 97 
firms between 1850 and 1915 to test if there is an association between the presence of 
community members in the industry and entry. Table 10 shows the pattern of entry in 
Bombay’s textile industry by social groups. Table 11 presents the probability of entry. The 
results show an association between the cumulative presence of members of a community 
and the probability of entry. Total number of firms in the industry also increased the 
probability of entry, but the effect was much smaller, confirming that social network effect 
mattered for decisions to enter.  In the jute industry too, for the first fifty years, the British 
firms were the only social group. Table 3 shows that all firms in 1915 were British. In 1929 
over 20 percent of the firms were Indian owned and set up by the Marwari traders. 
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Conclusion 
I have argued that informational asymmetry explains the industrial divide between 
British and Indian business. Geographical factors contributed to the location of tea, jute and 
coal in the hinterland of Calcutta and the cotton textile industry in Bombay. It is possible 
that discrimination against Indian business made their access to capital and certain product 
markets difficult.  However discrimination cannot explain their overwhelming presence in 
cotton textiles and the insignificant presence of British business in this sector.  Indian 
entrepreneurs had an informational advantage in the cotton textile industry. The 
involvement of British entrepreneurs in the export oriented industries and their limited 
presence in the main import substituting industry is best explained by informational 
constraints rather than discrimination.  The paper argues that this divide reflects the nature 
of the two product markets, local versus international, and highlights the importance of 
informational constraints in determining flows of entrepreneurship and capital. The role of 
the social networks in information flows further accentuated the segregation by economic 
activity. 
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Table 1: Control by the Top British Managing Agents in 1911- 14 
(No of Companies) 
 
Managing Agent Tea Jute Coal 
 Sterling  Rupee Sterling  Rupee Sterling Rupee 
Andrew Yule & Co  10  6  11 
Begg Dunlop & Co  10  2   
Bird & Co    8  11 
Davenport & Co  8     
Duncan Bros 6 12     
James Finlay 5     2 
Jardine Skinner & C0  2  2  2 
McLeod 5      
Octavious Steel & Co 13 10     
Planters’ Stores & Agency 6 1     
Shaw Wallace & Co 5 2    11 
Thomas Duff   4    
Williamson Magor  & Co 18 10    5 
Total 124 88 4 29  87 
Source: Bagchi (1972) , Tables 6.5 and 6.6, based on Investors’ India Year Book 
1911 and Tea Producing Companies 1914 
Note: There were many smaller agents, some managing one company in any one 
sector and more in others, some concentrated in one particular sector. 
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Table 2: Dominant Source of Capital and Entrepreneurship  by Industry 
(1914) 
INDUSTRY PRIMARY 
ENTREPRENEURS 
MAIN 
INVESTORS 
PRIMARY 
REGION 
TEA BRITISH 
 
BRITISH  IN 
BRITAIN 
CALCUTTA 
JUTE BRITISH BRITISH  IN INDIA CALCUTTA 
COAL BRITISH BRITISH  IN INDIA CALCUTTA 
COTTON 
TEXTILES 
INDIAN INDIAN BOMBAY 
NO. OF JOINT STOCK COMPANIES IN THE CITY AND HINTERLAND 
 CALCUTTA BOMBAY INDIA 
TEA 376 0 385 
JUTE 54 0 55 
COAL 225 5 232 
COTTON 
TEXTILES 
18 178 227 
Source: Statistical Abstract of British India. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Percentage shares of communities in enterprises: Bombay and Calcutta. 
BOMBAY: ALL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
1 
 
Year European Parsi Hindu Muslim Jewish 
1911 44 22 26 5 0 
1920 19 25 48 6 0 
BOMBAY: COTTON MILLS
2
 
1915 14 30 22 13 20 
1925 13 27 23 18 17 
CALCUTTA: 
1
 ALL COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES 
Year European Bengali Marwari Parsi Muslim 
1875 66 03 0 3 1 
1890 66 12 2 2 2 
1911 55 29 5 2 1 
1920 42 36 10 5 1 
CALCUTTA: JUTE MILLS
3
 
1915 100 0 0 0 0 
1929 78 0 22 0 0 
Note: Shares in total number of enterprises. 
Source: 
1
Calculated from Bagchi, 1997, pp98 & 105   
2
Calculated from Rutnagar 1926, 
p54, 
2
 Calculated from Goswami, 1992, pp 99-100 &107 
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Table 4: Sterling and Rupee Investment in 1914-15 (£m) 
COMPANIES STERLING RUPEE TOTAL 
TEA 19.7   2.9 22.6 
COTTON 0.4 13.0 13.9 
JUTE 2.7 7.8 10.5 
GOLD 2.3 0.3 2.4 
COTTON&JUTE 
PRESS 
1.2 1.2 2.4 
TOTAL 27.4 29.0 56.9 
Source: Chapman(1992) based on Indian Industrial Commission, II, p854, p123. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Average Paid-up Capital of Rupee Companies, Rupees ‘000 
 Cotton Tea  Jute Coal 
1881
a
 
 
688  
(28) 
244  
(113) 
958  
(8) 
649  
(6) 
1889
 b
 876 
(99) 
   
1891
a
 
 
852 
(57) 
253 1071 
(11) 
560 
(11) 
1900
 a
 
 
889 
(66) 
246 
(135) 
1444 
 (21) 
 411 
(34) 
1910
 c
 1575 
(43) 
339 
 
(87) 
3350 
(29) 
614 
(87) 
Source: 
a 
Based on
 Rungta’s industry level information,  
b 
Based on firm
 
level information from Bombay Millowners Association Report, 1889,
 
c
 Based on firm- level information from Investors’ India Year Book for 1911 
Note: figures in parenthesis indicate the number of firms. 
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Table 6:  Looms and Employment in Cotton and Jute Textiles 
Year No. of mills Average no. of loom 
equivalent/ looms per mill 
Average no. 
employed per mill 
Cotton    
1883-84 79 1043 60 
1893-94 142 1067 130 
1903-04 191 1121 185 
1913-14 271 1210 260 
Jute    
1883-84 23 267 2081 
1893-94 28 342 2471 
1903-04 38 484 3260 
1913-14 64 563 3379 
1926-27  554 3605 
1936-37  621 2765 
Source: Loom Equivalent for Cotton has been calculated using data from Morris 1982, 
p576 Jute is based on Morris 1982, p569, 615.  
Notes: For cotton, we aggregate looms and spindles into a loom-equivalent by multiplying 
spindles by 0.033, and adding the number of looms. See Gupta (2011) for details of the 
estimation.  
 
 
Table 7: Average Machinery and Employment by Category of Owner, 1924 
 Number of 
firms 
Looms/Loom 
Equivalent 
 per firm 
Workers  
per firm 
Average 
capital-
labor ratio 
Cotton firms  
in Bombay 
67 2516   
Indian 55 2615* 1929 1.14 
British 12 2061* 1773 1.13 
Jute firms  
in Calcutta 
54 961   
Indian 8 823**   
British 46 985** 
(0.78) 
  
Notes: * T- statistic for the difference between these numbers is 1.4 (not significant at 5% 
level). ** T- statistic for the difference between these numbers is 0.8 (not significant at 5% 
level). 
Source: Bombay Cotton Mills’ Association Report for 1934, Investors India Year Book for 
1934, Jute Mills Review 1935 
Notes: For cotton, we aggregate looms and spindles into a loom-equivalent by multiplying 
spindles by 0.033, and adding the number of looms. See Gupta (2011) for details of the 
estimation. The regional average in table 5 is computed from the aggregate data. The group 
averages have been computed by regressing loom equivalent/loom on ownership, within 
each industry. 
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TABLE 8: Capital-Labor Ratios by Community, Bombay Cotton Mills, 1924 
PARSI HINDU MUSLIM JEWISH EUROPEAN 
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.1 
Source: Calculations based on Rutnagar, 1927, p55. 
 
 
Table 9: Profit Rate and Dividend across Sectors in 1910 
Sector Profit Rate (%) Ordinary Dividend (%) 
 Mean(S.D) Median Mean (S.D) Median 
Jute  12 (12.9) 10 5.5 (0.05) 5 
Tea 16 (14.0) 12 12 (10.5) 10 
Coal 4 (13.9) 0 6.4 (16.0) 0 
Cotton 10 (19.0) 4 5.7 (6.6) 5 
Indian firms 9.4 (15.8)  6.6 (7.3)  
British firms 11.6 (25.6)  3.6 (4.1)  
Source: Investors’ India Year Books 1911-1913 
Note: Profit Rate is calculated as a ratio of net profit and paid- up capital 
 
 
Table 10: Bombay cotton mills: Number of Entrants, by Social group 
DECADE PARSI HINDU MUSLIM ENGLISH  JEWISH 
1850s 3 0 0 0 0 
1860s 5 2 0 0 0 
1870s 2 9 0 2 1 
1880s 9 5 1 9 2 
1890s 7 5 2 3 2 
1900s 2 0 1 1 0 
1910s 3 1 1 0 0 
Total 31 22 5 15 5 
Source: Calculations based on Rutnagur, Bombay Industries pp9-23. 
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Table 11: Probability of Entry  
 
Dependent Variable: Entry  
 Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
Specification 
3 
    
Cumulative 
Group 
Presence 
.73 (.07)**  0.54 (.10)** 
Total  Firms  0.13 (.03)** 0.14 (.04)** 
Social Group 
Effect 
Yes   Yes 
Year Effect Yes  Yes 
Log 
Likelihood 
-381.1 -386.5 -374.7 
Source: Bombay Cotton Mill’s Association Reports, Rungta, 1929, and Rutnagur 
Note: The model is estimated as an unbalanced panel Probit, Social groups are numbered as 
follows: 1. Parsi, 2.Hindu 3. English, 4. Jewish and 5. Muslim.   
Standard Errors are reported in parenthesis. Cumulative group presence is the total number 
of firms from the social group. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: RUPEE INVESTMENT IN DIFFERENT SECTORS, 1880-1914 
 
Source: Rungta, The Rise of Business Corporations, p 296-29 for 1880-1900  
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FIGURE 2: ESTMATES OF INVESTMENT IN COTTON AND JUTE MILLS  
GROSS REAL INVESTMENT IN COTTON IN WESTERN INDIA AND JUTE IN BENGAL
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
19
05
-0
6
19
06
-0
7
19
07
-0
8
19
08
-0
9
19
09
-1
0
19
10
-1
1
19
11
-1
2
19
12
-1
3
19
13
-1
4
19
14
-1
5
19
15
-1
6
19
16
-1
7
19
17
-1
8
19
18
-1
9
19
19
-2
0
19
20
-2
1
19
21
-2
2
19
22
-2
3
19
23
-2
4
19
24
-2
5
19
25
-2
6
19
26
-2
7
19
27
-2
8
19
28
-2
9
19
29
-3
0
19
30
-3
1
YEARS
R
U
P
E
E
S
 '
0
0
0
GROSS INVESTMENT IN JUTE
GRASS INVESTMENT IN COTTON
 
Source: Bagchi, Private Investment, pp 258, 273.  
Note: Gross investment is calculated by multiplying the real import value by the ratio of the 
block value of mills to the total value of plant and machinery in those mils. The figures are 
1.54 for cotton and 1.72 for jute. 
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Figure 3: Entry by Social Group 
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Note: Comm No. lists social groups 1. Parsi, 2. Hindu, 3. English, 4. Jewish and  
 5. Muslim 
 
